000			02053nam a2200361 i 4500
001			CR9781009317344
003			UkCbUP
005			20240508141515.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			220610s2023||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781009317344 (ebook)
020			_z9781009462273 (hardback)
020			_z9781009317337 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
050		4	_aB808.9 _b.M67 2023
082	0	4	_a126 _223
100	1		_aMørch, Hedda Hassel, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aNon-physicalist theories of consciousness / _cHedda Hassel Mørch.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2023.
300			_a1 online resource (78 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aCambridge elements. Elements in philosophy of mind, _x2633-9080
506	0		_aOpen Access. _fUnrestricted online access _2star
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Dec 2023).
520			_aIs consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. This Element will introduce the main non-physicalist theories of consciousness and explain the most important arguments for them, and consider how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
650		0	_aConsciousness.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781009462273
830		0	_aCambridge elements. _pElements in philosophy of mind, _x2633-9080.
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009317344
999			_c38589 _d38589