000 02260nam a2200361 i 4500
001 CR9781009003575
003 UkCbUP
005 20240508141514.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr||||||||||||
008 201022s2022||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020 _a9781009003575 (ebook)
020 _z9781009009157 (paperback)
040 _aUkCbUP
_beng
_erda
_cUkCbUP
050 0 0 _aQ175
_b.N414 2022
082 0 4 _a501
_223
100 1 _aNguyen, James,
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aScientific representation /
_cJames Nguyen, Roman Frigg.
264 1 _aCambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2022.
300 _a1 online resource (80 pages) :
_bdigital, PDF file(s).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aCambridge elements. Elements in the philosophy of science,
_x2517-7273
500 _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 31 Aug 2022).
520 _aThis Element presents a philosophical exploration of the notion of scientific representation. It does so by focussing on an important class of scientific representations, namely scientific models. Models are important in the scientific process because scientists can study a model to discover features of reality. But what does it mean for something to represent something else? This is the question discussed in this Element. The authors begin by disentangling different aspects of the problem of representation and then discuss the dominant accounts in the philosophical literature: the resemblance view and inferentialism. They find them both wanting and submit that their own preferred option, the so-called DEKI account, not only eschews the problems that beset these conceptions, but further provides a comprehensive answer to the question of how scientific representation works. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
650 0 _aScience
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aScience
_xMethodology.
700 1 _aFrigg, Roman,
_eauthor.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_z9781009009157
830 0 _aCambridge elements.
_pElements in the philosophy of science,
_x2517-7273.
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009003575
999 _c38543
_d38543